

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
DRAFT

(311)

INT 781/1

TOP SECRET  
May 10, 1968  
Copy No. 22

COMMITTEE OF SPECIAL STUDIES

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider measures for the furtherance of covert operations in the interest of our national security.

ANALYSIS

2. The means employed by a nation in pursuit of its national objectives may be both overt and covert. They range in time of peace from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as CIP), and "white" informational activities, to such covert operations as acknowledged support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" propaganda and encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

3. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged in a "cold war" by the full weight of the Kremlin, the U. S. cannot afford to leave unutilized its resources for covert operations. The U. S. cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to rely upon improvised covert operations [REDACTED]

4. In SEC 4d provision was made for the conduct of certain covert psychological (propaganda) operations. The SAEACC has considered such matters as utilization of refugees (SAEACC 395) from the USSR in the United States national interest, plans for evacuation of key foreign personnel (SAEACC 396), demolition of oil facilities (SAEACC 398), and psychological warfare (SAEACC 394). In connection with psychological warfare, the views of the JCS, communicated to by SAHAC, have been referred to the SEC for consideration. It is

TOP SECRET

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

INT 781/2  
TOP SECRET

the opinion of the JCS that from the military point of view "there should be established, as soon as practicable, under the SEC, a Psychological Warfare Organization, but with its peacetime scope and activities limited to that of a working nucleus for planning and coordination", (AMEMC 304/11). The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State has also recommended that covert operations be immediately instituted under unified direction.

5. In the light of the above considerations, there is a need for an organization which is designed to strengthen and extend current covert operations in the interest of our national security and to provide for plans and preparations for the conduct, in time of war, of covert operations and of the overt phases of psychological warfare. The establishment of such an organization will require the revision of SEC 4-A.

CONCLUSIONS

6. The proposed SEC Directive in Annex A should be approved, and if approved, the proposed revision of SEC 4-A in Annex B should be approved.

**UNCLASSIFIED**